The Swiss Tournament Model by Hua, Christopher
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
2017
The Swiss Tournament Model
Christopher Hua
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
Part of the Business Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/149
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Hua, Christopher, "The Swiss Tournament Model" (2017). Wharton Research Scholars. 149.
https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/149
The Swiss Tournament Model
Abstract
The Swiss tournament structure is well-known and commonly used, particularly in chess, be- cause of its
seemingly simple heuristic of preferring matchups with teams of similar win count. However, it has proven
difficult to simulate. This paper presents a framework for simulation and investigation of Swiss-style
tournaments and other similar tournaments. This paper con- siders the desirability of this tournament
structure in different contexts, using simulation and empirical results, with particular emphasis on recovering
partial and full rankings. The re- sults show that while the Swiss structure performs well under certain criteria,
under many circumstances it does not outperform a simple random pairing of teams.
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Abstract
The Swiss tournament structure is well-known and commonly used, particularly in chess, be-
cause of its seemingly simple heuristic of preferring matchups with teams of similar win count.
However, it has proven difficult to simulate. This paper presents a framework for simulation
and investigation of Swiss-style tournaments and other similar tournaments. This paper con-
siders the desirability of this tournament structure in different contexts, using simulation and
empirical results, with particular emphasis on recovering partial and full rankings. The re-
sults show that while the Swiss structure performs well under certain criteria, under many
circumstances it does not outperform a simple random pairing of teams.
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Introduction
An important goal of tournaments is to find an overall winner, but it is often important to find
the top-k contestants as well. This paper considers the effectiveness of Swiss-style tournaments
in finding a partial ranking over the top-k contestants, and compares those results to fully
random tournaments with the same number of rounds. We find that in the case of American
high school policy debate, Swiss tournaments do not offer much advantage versus randomly
paired tournaments. However, we identify several conditions under which Swiss tournaments
outperform the random pairing method.
Swiss-style tournaments are typically credited to J. Muller of Switzerland, who first used the
tournament structure to run a chess tournament at Zurich in 1895 (Federation 2003). There
are many variations on the general structure of the Swiss tournament, but the key idea is
that the first few rounds are randomly paired, and the remaining rounds are power-matched.
Powermatching means teams are paired with teams that have similar records, i.e. same number
of wins or at most 1 difference. These are subject to the constraints that teams cannot debate
teams from the same school, and they cannot debate teams who they have been paired with in
earlier rounds.
A simple example of where this is useful is a preliminary tournament used for seeding pur-
poses, prior to an elimination tournament. In some cases, knowing an exact ranking within
this top subgroup is important, such as when a tournament will pay out monetary rewards
based on finishing place; in other cases, knowing the exact ranking is not as important. A fur-
ther advantage is that the Swiss tournament can be run with an arbitrary number of rounds,
making the structure flexible to tournament constraints on time and space.
Understanding the performance of the Swiss tournament, and other tournament structures,
can lead to important decisions. Tournaments are often used in high-stakes settings, includ-
ing Swiss tournaments, and understanding the theoretical performance of tournaments can
improve the parity for all involved actors. Additionally, these results can be used to inform
further research direction in pairwise comparisons. One major reason that Swiss tournaments
have not been studied before is the complexity in determining pairings and performing the
simulation in an efficient way. A major contribution of this thesis, in addition to its analysis, is
the tournament simulation framework which we implement and make available in Python.
2
This paper presents the case of American high school policy debate, in which teams compete
in “regular-season” tournaments throughout the year in order to win ‘bids’ to the Tournament
of Championships, the de facto culminating championship. Each round has two teams of
two debaters, one “affirmative” (aff) and one “negative” (neg), and a judge. The affirmative
side argues a policy-based plan which affirms that year’s debate resolution, and the negative
argues against the affirmative. For example, the 2012-13 resolution was “The United States
federal government should substantially increase its transportation infrastructure investment
in the United States.”
All tournaments are structured in two parts, with a preliminary Swiss-system tournament and
then a knockout/single-elimination tournament. The ultimate goal of “regular season” tour-
naments is to earn a bid to the “championship” tournament, the Tournament of Champions.
These are allocated to tournaments roughly on the basis of tournament size and strength; the
effect is that tournaments with more bids attract stronger teams. The bids are set up so that
teams who make it to a given round of the tournament get the bid, e.g. octafinals means 16
bids, semifinals is 4 bids, etc. A perverse result of this bid system is that rounds after the bid
round, containing the best teams, are treated as unimportant - teams routinely run less seri-
ous arguments or simply forfeit rounds - but the bid round and earlier rounds have enormous
strategic investment.
This setup leads us to consider the efficacy of the Swiss-tournament design, in finding this
top-k ranking.
Literature Review
Previous research has been done into creating tournament structures, and considering the var-
ious desirable aspects to optimize for.
Part of the simulation process involves finding pairings of competitors for each round, which
are directly analogous to a matching, a set of n disjoint pairs of participants. In particular,
the Swiss tournament structure is considered in Ólafsson (1990). Ólafsson considers the Swiss
tournament structure and various chess-specific considerations; however, he focuses on an
algorithm to create pairings which fulfill chess’s requirements. He presents a method using
maximum weight perfect matching to perform the pairing matching. Under this method, the
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tournament staff employ a graph structure to represent the teams (nodes) and the possible
pairings (edges). The graph is initialized as a complete graph with equal weights; that is, all
possible pairings are equally desirable, which fits the structure of a random initial pairing. The
graph is complete because any team could play each other, but we can represent desirability
via edge weights. At the conclusion of each round, the edges are reweighted to fit the desir-
ability of the pairing. These weights are functions of various competitive factors, including the
difference in wins, how many rounds they have played on white/black, whether the pairing
has already occurred, and others. The general idea is that a higher weight represents a higher
preference. Then, the maximum weight perfect matching algorithm finds a matching among
the possible pairs.
The weighted perfect matching algorithm is a well-studied problem in computer science and
graph theory. The first polynomial time algorithm for the problem was found by Edmonds
(1965), known as Edmond’s blossom algorithm, and is still largely in use, though improved
on by numerous others, including Cook and Rohe (1999) and most recently by Kolmogorov
(2009). The implementation used in this paper follows most directly the process given by Galil
(1986). This implementation runs with time complexity O(nm log n), where n is the number of
nodes and m is the number of edges in the graph. Exact details on the method can be found in
any of these papers, or from examining the source code of the open-source programs used for
simulation.
In a similar vein, Kujansuu, Lindberg, and Erkki (1999) present a method for pairing play-
ers as an extension of the stable roommates problem. The canonical reference for the stable
roommates problem is McVitie and Wilson (1971). In the stable roommates problem, each
“roommate” creates a full preference ranking of the others. Then, the matching is stable if
there are no potential roommates i and j who prefer each other to their matched roommate. In
the tournament context, after each round, each team has a preference list constructed for them
of the teams available to play. The weights can be assigned in a similar manner to Olafsson and
have a relatively analogous meaning, representing how preferable a possible pairing between
two teams is.
To my knowledge, very few other studies have considered the effectiveness of the Swiss tour-
nament structure, though previous researchers have investigated the knockout and the round
robin tournament structures, e.g. Isabelle et al. (2013) or Mcgarry, Schutz, and Schutz (1997).
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In particular, Mcgarry, Schutz, and Schutz (1997) chooses not to investigate the Swiss tourna-
ment because of the computational complexities in the Swiss pairing procedure. With more
modern technology, we choose to tackle this problem.
Research by Glickman and Jensen (2005) has considered alternative tournament formulations
from a more theoretical basis. Specifically, Glickman and Jensen present a tournament struc-
ture where rounds are matched by maximizing expected Kullback-Leibler distance, a measure
of difference between distributions. The pairings are picked such that they maximize the ex-
pected Kullback-Leibler distance between the prior and posterior distributions of θ, the dis-
tribution of player strengths. This model is heavily influenced by Bayesian optimal design.
Notably, Swiss tournaments out-perform their model for small numbers of rounds.
Hanes (2015) researched the effect of power matching in policy debate tournaments, compar-
ing the outcomes from the win rankings with the speaker points assigned to teams. He finds
a disparity between the two rankings, and argues that we should prefer the results given by
speaker point rankings instead, or at minimum a combination of wins and speaker points. It
is worth noting that he considers the implications across a full season, while we focus on the
effects on a tournament level.
Solution Approach
Tournaments are repeated sets of paired comparisons, and we employ what is known as the
Bradley-Terry model to understand the comparisons (Bradley and Terry 1952). The Bradley-
Terry model belongs to a family of models known as linear paired comparison models, where
win probabilities are only affected by player strengths in terms of the delta between the pairs.
For several reasons, it is one of the most, if not the most, popular models for analyzing pairwise
comparisons. It is given by:
Pr(Yi,j = 1) =
θi
θi + θj
Here, Yi,j is an indicator for the outcome of the pairwise comparison between competitors i
and j, and θi and θj represent the underlying strength of competitors i and j. These θ values
are relatively unconstrained, though under the traditional B-T assumptions they are positive
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numbers.
We draw these strength parameters from empirically estimated Bradley-Terry strength param-
eters drawn from a dataset containing the results of the full 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 debate
seasons. The net effect is that we can closely see the results of tournaments under real and
simulated conditions. We also test the model performance under different probability distri-
butions, because we do not assume that the debate parameters are representative of all results.
Tournament design and procedure
As described above, teams compete in six rounds of competition, with the first two rounds
randomly paired and the following rounds power-matched. We implement this procedure
using an adaption of the maximum weight perfect matching technique (Ólafsson 1990).
Our process is as follows:
1. Team strengths are generated according to the given distribution, parameters, and ran-
dom seed. In the case of empirical data, we pick a number of teams n and then draw
the n strengths without replacement. Teams are represented as nodes in a symmetric
directed graph, and edges are possible pairings.
2. A first round is paired randomly.
3. Results for the round are simulated and recorded, following the Bradley-Terry model for
pairwise comparisons.
4. All rounds after the second are paired using maximum weight perfect matching.
5. After the second round, we reweight the graph.
The maximum weight perfect matching procedure is an ingenious method to guarantee good
pairings. We have several desirable characteristics in pairings: first, that teams which play
each other should not meet in further rounds, and that teams should prefer teams which have
the same win total, but if necessary, play teams with a difference of 1 win. We can represent
these characteristics within our graph model of a tournament by assigning weights to edges
which reflect the desirability of the pairing. Our exact formula for weighting a possible pairing
between teams i and j is as follows:
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Wi,j = α − (β ∗ |si − sj|)2
Here, α and β are constants which can be thought of as a location and scale parameter, respec-
tively. We also present a delta value, |si − sj|, which is the absolute value of the the difference
between the two teams’ wins. To make computation easier, we avoid negative weights by first
checking the win delta and setting the pairing to a weight of 1 if the difference is greater than 1
win. When a particular pairing is done, we assign the pairing a weight of 0. This method lends
itself to a maximum weight method because the larger a weight is on a particular pairing the
more desirable it is in a pairing.
Weights are rebalanced at the end of each round, i.e. when all pairings are simulated. All edges
that have not been picked are rebalanced, since even if a pairing is undesirable after k rounds,
it could be desirable for the k + 1 round. Picked edges are assigned fixed weights of 0 so that
they are not picked. We then develop a pairing for the next round, which is represented as a
maximum weight perfect matching. We use Edmond’s blossom algorithm, as implemented in
Python by NetworkX (Hagberg, Schult, and Swart 2008).
Although the algorithm which we use runs in O(nm log n) time, since our graph is fully con-
nected, we have m = n(n − 1)/2, which means that the algorithm runs in O(n3) time, where n
is the number of teams competing. This becomes computationally intensive for relatively large
tournaments but relatively manageable.
Note that the algorithm is used to find pairings for round 2, since the round is intended to
be randomly paired. At this point the graph is initialized with equal weights for every pair-
ing except those which have occurred, which have a 0 weighting. Then, since we have no
other constraints, the maximum weight perfect matching returns an acceptable pairing which
conveniently guarantees no repeat matches.
If we wish to create random pairings, we only need to modify the weighting procedure. Here,
we draw a random integer value for any pairing which hasn’t yet occurred and assign that as
the weight. Then, the maximum-weight perfect matching procedure will come up with a set
of pairings which have not occurred, where any pairing is equally likely to be picked.
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Variables tested
We consider the effect of several different variables on the results from the tournament. For
each of these variables, we create a simulation setup with those varied variables, and then run
500 simulations of the modeled tournaments.
We consider several different tournament configurations, and run 500 simulated tournaments
for each of them. We repeated these experiments using empirical and simulated data.
First, we consider the effect of the number of teams in the tournament. We use configurations
with 32, 64, 128, and 256 teams, with 6 rounds each. Second, we consider the effects of the
number of rounds. We use a tournament with 64 teams to find the top-16 teams, and use
rounds between 3 and 9.
Metrics reported
This paper reports several metrics of success, which are described below. In general, these
are measures of how well the given tournament determines the best team, how well the tour-
nament captures the top-K partial ranking, and how well the tournament captures the full
ranking.
A number of metrics come from the search ranking literature, which generally focuses on the
idea of “relevant” results. Consider the case of a search engine, which wants to return useful
results to a given user query. For each user, the “best” result might be subjective, but all the
results on the first page should be at least relevant. In our context, we define a relevant team
as a team within the top-k teams by underlying strength rank. The metrics we specify are
well-defined and commonly accepted; see e.g. Agichtein, Brill, and Dumais (2006).
• Undefeated champion: First, the experiments indicate if the top-rated player went un-
defeated throughout the tournament.
• Copeland champion: Similarly, we also measure if the top-rated player is at least tied for
first place. Note that this condition should be strictly more common than the undefeated
champion condition, since an undefeated player must be at minimum tied for first. This
is known as the Copeland winning condition, which is any player with a maximum score
(Saari and Merlin 1996).
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• Top-K percent: Each of these tournaments has a particular K associated with them. These
hark back to the goal of finding the K teams who will earn a bid for the tournament; here,
we show the percent of teams in the top-K by strength who also place that highly by win
rank. This can also be thought of as a partial ranking measure, because we test for group
membership of the top-k teams but not the actual placement among those teams.
• Precision at K: the percent of top-K teams by wins, which are truly top-K teams as mea-
sured by underlying strength metric.
• (Normalized) discounted cumulative gain at K: The NDCG is given by N = M ∑Ki=1(2r(j)−
1)/ log(1 + i). This metric is a function of the relevance of the team ranked at position i,
with additional priority applied to the top teams by wins. The term M is a normalization
constant, which adjusts the maximum gain to 1, which is obtained by a perfect ranking.
• Kendall’s τ: Kendall tau-b is given by τB = nc−nd√
(n0−n1)(n0−n2)
(Kendall 1945). We use the
tau-b implementation as it is robust to ties in rank, which happen quite often in this
context, since there are a discrete number of rounds played.
• Spearman’s ρ: Spearman’s rho is given by rs = ρrgX ,rgY =
cov(rgX, rgY)
σrgX σrgY
(Zwillinger and
Kokoska 2001). This metric, along with Kendall’s tau, is a measure of full ranking accu-
racy.
We do not report the p-values of the Kendall or Spearman coefficients because these values are
all 0.001 or lower, and very highly significant.
Validation
Data
We scraped multiple sources of pairwise comparison data, including 2 year-long datasets, cov-
ering multiple policy debate tournaments in the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 seasons. The 2009-
2010 dataset consists of 13310 debated rounds by 1424 teams, in 67 tournaments. The 2010-2011
dataset consists of 12915 debated rounds by 1521 teams, in 71 tournaments. We choose to use
these datasets because they represent a large sample of teams with repeated comparisons in
the data. This should yield better results in terms of finding underlying strength parameters.
Using these datasets and their final results, we can estimate Bradley-Terry parameters for the
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teams participating in those tournaments. Our maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) is done
using the R language (R Core Team 2016). In particular, we use the BradleyTerryScalable
package (Kaye and Firth 2017). This package follows the procedure laid out in Caron and
Doucet (2010) for maximum likelihood estimation of Bradley-Terry parameters when Ford’s
assumption does not hold. Ford’s assumption is: in every possible partition of players into two
non-empty subsets, some individual in the second set beats some individual in the first set at
least once (Ford 1957). Our datasets are very sparse and cover a wide range of teams, meaning
that Ford’s assumption does not hold; in particular, this means that the more traditional MLE
estimation methods of minorization-maximization (Hunter 2004) and Iterative-Luce Spectral
Ranking (Maystre and Grossglauser 2015) cannot be used.
In particular, for each year of data, we typically find 2 or 3 such disjoint groups. The parameters
estimates should hold for in-group analysis, but cannot be used in comparing members of
these disjoint groups (Huang, Lin, and Weng 2005).1 However, we have for each year a single
dominant group, which contains the vast majority of members. For example, the 2009-2010
dataset has a group with 1376 of 1424 teams, or 96.6% of the teams). It is thus a reasonable
assumption that these groups are representative of the whole dataset, so we run the same
experiments as above using these empirical results.
For these simulations, we run 500 simulations in each configuration, similar to our process
with the simulated data, and examine the difference in each.
Below, we show a histogram of the empirically determined parameters, with facets for the
2009-2010 season, 2010-2011 season, and a lognormal distribution whose logarithm has mean
equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1. Note that the x-scales are different, but the shapes
are very similar - this is acceptable because the Bradley-Terry model is scale-invariant.[ˆinvariant]
[ˆinvariant] By this, we mean that we could multiply the parameter vector θ by some scale
constant Λ and the likelihood estimates will not vary. See e.g. Caron and Doucet (2010).
This distribution of strength makes sense in general. The distribution implies a large number
of bad teams, with most teams being somewhat mediocre, and a small number of extremely
strong teams. Given certain aspects of the debate community structure, this is likely a reason-
1A simple illustration of this would be to take two groups of people and make pairwise comparisons within each
group, but without involving the other group. Then, if we recorded these results in a dataset and attempted to
estimate parameters, we would necessarily need two groups of results.
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Figure 1: Empirically determined Bradley-Terry strengths from actual tournaments
able estimate of the true parameters. The debate community is relatively small but with a high
level of inequality, especially at the high school level. Competition is traditionally dominated
by a small number of elite schools in wealthy areas (e.g. North Shore of Chicago, suburbs
of Dallas), who can afford to hire coaches and pay for expensive specialized summer camps.
These inequalities are compounded by the strongly traditional culture and history of the activ-
ity, though this has begun to change in recent years (Reid-Brinkley 2008).
Results
As noted above, we ran simulations using the empirically determined strength parameters and
tested the effects of changing certain variables.
Varying rounds
For this configuration, we used a tournament structure with 64 teams and 6 rounds, where
we are interested in finding the top-16 teams. We show the effect of changing the number of
rounds here, and illustrating the effects between 3 and 9 rounds. First, we consider the metrics
which we would consider measures of full ranking performance.
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Figure 2: Full ranking metrics
Here, there is no clear overriding pattern for Swiss versus random pairings in their perfor-
mance. Most metrics appear to move in step with each other under both frameworks. One
noticeable trend is that the “undefeated champ” metric decreases in the Swiss tournament
with increased numbers of rounds, while that metric stays higher under random pairings.
This is because the Swiss tournament should be pairing the top team with stronger teams,
while the random tournament should give easier matchups. The larger a tournament is, with
random pairings, the likelier that the top team is undefeated. This is reasonable because the
top team should get easier placements in the random framework than in the power-matched
framework, which is the goal of the Swiss-style tournament. While this finding has little effect
on the debate tournaments, which place relatively little emphasis on preliminary winners, it
is important for other contexts in which Swiss tournaments are used to pick winners, such as
chess.
Next, we examine metrics more closely tied to partial-rankings.
The results here look substantially similar, again. We see the same general trends in the metrics
between both pairing methods. Interestingly, there appears to be the best performance at m = 4
rounds, in terms of the top-K metric. For both random and Swiss pairings, around 97% of the
top-16 teams are picked correctly here. For small numbers of rounds (less than 7) the Swiss
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Figure 3: Partial ranking metrics
tournament performs better than the randomly paired tournament under the search ranking
metrics.
This same characteristic was noted by Glickman and Jensen (2005), where their tournament
model underperformed Swiss tournaments in sum of squared deviations in ranks (SSDR) for
tournaments of 4 and 8 rounds, but was better in 16 round specifications. One possible expla-
nation is that the random pairing rounds employed by Swiss tournaments in the first 2 rounds
actually contribute the most to the full rankings, and the power-matched rounds reduce the
accuracy. Further research could test the effect of varying the number of random rounds used
in the Swiss tournament, to balance the goals of picking a top-k group of teams as well as
yielding fair rankings to all participants.
Varying teams
We show the effect of varying the number of teams. Here, we varied the numbers of teams,
with 32, 64, 128, and 256 teams. For our partial ranking measures, we fixed k at n/4, that is,
where k = 8, 16, 32, 64. Essentially, we found the top quarter of teams.
First we graphically represent the full ranking measures.
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Figure 4: Full ranking metrics
It appears that Swiss pairings are somewhat better under these metrics than the random pair-
ings. Interestingly, random pairings in the 64 team case perform poorly on the correlation
measures but perform well in picking the top team by underlying strength.
We also show the results for the partial ranking metrics.
Under the search ranking metrics of net cumulative discounted gain and precision at K, the
random pairing significantly outperforms the Swiss tournament. For both pairings, the best
results are obtained with a 64 team tournament, which is interesting given the poorer perfor-
mance on the full-ranking metrics seen above. It is possible that there is a tradeoff between
performance in identifying a top-K set of teams and identifying the full ranking, and that’s
being seen in these results. The percent of top-K teams identified, however, seems to perform
worst with 64 teams and using the random pairing.
With the random pairings framework, for the large and extra large tournaments, the ranking
measures defined over all of the teams actually show better results than for the Swiss-style
pairings. This is a pretty surprising result, especially because the Swiss-style tournament per-
forms noticeably better than the random pairing tournament in picking the top-k teams. This
can be thought of as a discrepancy between partial ranking and full-ranking measures. Under-
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Figure 5: Partial ranking metrics
standing why this discrepancy exists would be a worthwhile research direction.
Overall, we find limited support for the hypothesis that the Swiss tournament leads to better
empirical results than the random pairing model.
Results under exponential distribution
While in the above sections we used empirical data drawn from the distribution of debate data,
we consider here an alternate setting, using Bradley-Terry strength parameters drawn from the
exponential distribution.
The probability density function of the exponential distribution is given by:
f (x; λ) =

λe−λx x ≥ 0,
0 x < 0.
We also show the PDF of an exponential distribution with scale parameter λ of 3. Although
the shape is superficially similar to that of the lognormal distribution, the exponential is less
uniform, that is, with larger kurtosis. This means that teams are less similar in strength.
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Figure 6: Exponential distribution
While this distribution of parameters doesn’t necessarily fit the results of the group of debaters,
it might fit the distribution of strength in other settings, such as in a chess tournament. In a
championship chess tournament, certain chess players may be simply dominant versus others
by skill, whereas in a debate, a well-prepared but weaker team may be able to come up with
certain The implication is that the strengths are less widely dispersed.
Varying rounds
We show the results of varying the number of rounds for a 64 team tournament here, under the
exponential distribution of strengths. First, we consider the effect on the full ranking measures.
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Figure 7: Full ranking results - varying rounds
Similarly to the empirical experiments, we do not see much difference in these full ranking
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metrics, between the Swiss and random pairing methods.
Next, we consider the partial ranking measures.
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Figure 8: Partial ranking measures - varying rounds
Here, the Swiss tournament appears to clearly outperform the random pairings, for all but 8
or 9 round tournaments. Interestingly, the top-K results seem to monotically decrease for both
methods; however, the search ranking results clearly favor the Swiss tournament across each
round configuration.
Varying teams
We ran in an identical setup the
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Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a flexible framework for working with Swiss tournaments
and understanding the implications of their results. Previous researchers have not simulated
and studied Swiss tournaments because of the computational complexities in performing the
pairing procedure, and this paper represents a major step forward as well as a synthesis of the
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existing work.
A common argument against Swiss-style tournaments is that they provide poor results for
top debate teams, because of possible disparities in schedule strength. We do not find proof
for this hypothesis, when comparing the Swiss-style tournament to a randomly paired tour-
nament with similar settings. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that, in general, Swiss
tournaments yield better top-K partial or full rankings of competitors.
A key limitation of our analysis is that we focused on the case of American high school policy
debate, which is a relatively small edge case in terms of tournaments. We examined the case
of exponentially distributed strength parameters, under which the Swiss tournament does in-
deed perform better than randomly paired teams. Here, the results are similar among the
full ranking measures but clearly show better performance among the partial ranking metrics.
This suggests that Swiss tournaments can perform better than random pairings, under certain
conditions, and one major condition is the overdispersion of strength parameters.
While our analysis takes into account empirical outcomes from the tournament, these are not
the only considerations that tournament organizers must consider. There are numerous prac-
tical and operational considerations which might inform the pairing procedure.
An example of a structure made inpractical by these considerations would be a round-robin
tournament. In a large tournament, we would not reasonably expect teams to winningly par-
ticipate in hundreds of rounds, especially in debate, where each round is expected to take
around 2 hours.
A particularly curious question is why the Swiss tournament performs well for small tour-
naments (both in terms of rounds and teams involved) but does not perform well in larger
settings, when compared to a random pairing. Further work could investigate the differences
in strengths that are created in the Swiss model vs a random model.
Additionally, work has been done to create alternative tournament pairing methods, such as
in Glickman and Jensen (2005). Given our particular question of finding top-k teams, it would
be useful to test these other models. One note is that while the Glickman model performs well
in theory, the computational difficulty and explanation difficulty would likely make it difficult
to implement in practice. Our study considered models which are feasible to implement in the
real world.
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In the end, these operational concerns may override the theoretical considerations for choosing
any particular structure. Swiss tournaments are relatively easy to comprehend (even if they
are difficult to implement), keep participants engaged by minimizing rounds with disparate
ability, and are flexible enough to increase or decrease the number of rounds with minimal
disruption.
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Appendix
Code
Code and all other resources used in writing this paper can be found at the author’s Github.
A major issue in the simulation of Swiss tournaments for analysis is the difficulty of creating
pairings. A key contribution here is a comprehensive review of and the simplification of that
problem.
The software which we used to implement the model and perform simulations is open-source
and intended to be extensible. Within our paper, we take advantage of this, by utilizing a
common framework for testing different numbers of teams and rounds, as well as creating
summary statistics. Furthermore, we implement a random pairing model in the model for
comparison testing.
In the paper, we drew our theoretical strengths from a lognormal distribution with a mean
µ = 0, and a standard deviation σ = 1. Our framework includes support for the following
distributions:
• Exponential distribution
• Uniform distribution
• Lognormal distribution
• Beta distribution
• Gamma distribution
Each of the above can be specified, along with optional shape parameters in the tournament
and simulation keyword arguments. See the author’s simulation code for examples on how to
make these configurations.
Distributional effects
Here, we show four distributions which we used to model team strength, as well as the default
parameters that we used.
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Expected results
Some of the calculated statistics should be very simulation dependent, particularly the results
which measure interaction with other teams. However, we can easily calculate a lower-bound
on the top-team going undefeated, which is a particular win condition.
Under the Bradley-Terry model, we have fixed win probabilities for each possible pairings
of teams. We can construct a win probability matrix M, that is, each cell Mi,j represents the
probability that team i beats team j.
We illustrate here a simple such matrix; given four teams with Bradley-Terry parameters of
1, 2, 3, 4, we obtain the following probability matrix:

0.50 0.33 0.25 0.20
0.67 0.50 0.40 0.33
0.75 0.60 0.50 0.43
0.80 0.67 0.57 0.50

Then, we can estimate a lower-bound on the chance of the top-team going undefeated, which
happens if the team faces the strongest possible teams for the entire tournament. We calculate
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the lower bound for two scenarios - if the top team is paired versus the top-6 teams and versus
the top-4 teams, essentially excluding the randomly paired rounds.
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
Exponential Gamma Lognormal Uniform
rowname
V
al
ue
Bound
X1
X2
However, note that in tournaments with no more than log2 n rounds, where n is the number
of teams, there must be an undefeated team. Under that condition, we would still expect the
top-rated team to have the highest chance of finishing undefeated and on top.
Tables for graphs
Rounds Pairings Undef Champ Tied Champ Top K Precision at K NDCG Tau Rho
3 Swiss 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.31 0.27 0.42 0.57
4 Swiss 0.71 0.71 0.99 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.58
5 Swiss 0.76 0.76 0.87 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.47
6 Swiss 0.41 0.41 0.87 0.31 0.24 0.47 0.62
7 Swiss 0.33 0.33 0.75 0.25 0.32 0.44 0.59
8 Swiss 0.55 0.55 0.86 0.12 0.24 0.57 0.73
9 Swiss 0.41 0.41 0.65 0.12 0.09 0.52 0.68
3 Random 0.04 0.04 0.57 0.31 0.28 0.47 0.64
4 Random 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.31 0.30 0.47 0.59
5 Random 0.40 0.40 0.90 0.31 0.27 0.42 0.55
6 Random 0.64 0.64 0.87 0.31 0.27 0.50 0.65
7 Random 0.19 0.19 0.72 0.12 0.08 0.43 0.58
8 Random 0.85 0.85 0.74 0.31 0.29 0.47 0.62
9 Random 0.86 0.86 0.77 0.31 0.23 0.51 0.67
Table 1: Empirical - varying rounds, means
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Size Pairings Undef Champ Tied Champ Top K Precision at K NDCG Tau Rho
32 Random 0.39 0.39 0.83 0.12 0.07 0.53 0.67
64 Random 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.44 0.56 0.38 0.51
128 Random 0.27 0.27 0.74 0.25 0.23 0.43 0.57
256 Random 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.20 0.21 0.46 0.61
32 Swiss 0.92 0.92 0.80 0.12 0.07 0.51 0.65
64 Swiss 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.31 0.41 0.47 0.61
128 Swiss 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.19 0.17 0.45 0.59
256 Swiss 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.17 0.13 0.48 0.62
Table 2: Empirical - varying teams, means
Rounds Pairings Undef Champ Tied Champ Top K Precision at K NDCG Tau Rho
3 Swiss 0.86 0.86 0.97 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.59
4 Swiss 0.51 0.51 0.91 0.38 0.27 0.47 0.60
5 Swiss 0.63 0.63 0.88 0.38 0.23 0.53 0.68
6 Swiss 0.87 0.87 0.77 0.38 0.25 0.57 0.61
7 Swiss 0.88 0.89 0.66 0.31 0.32 0.42 0.56
8 Swiss 0.20 0.20 0.60 0.19 0.16 0.48 0.63
9 Swiss 0.46 0.46 0.57 0.19 0.13 0.45 0.60
3 Random 0.59 0.59 0.98 0.25 0.19 0.46 0.58
4 Random 0.37 0.37 0.93 0.12 0.10 0.47 0.60
5 Random 0.50 0.50 0.89 0.25 0.20 0.52 0.67
6 Random 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.25 0.27 0.46 0.73
7 Random 0.20 0.20 0.73 0.19 0.13 0.46 0.62
8 Random 0.09 0.09 0.58 0.19 0.19 0.45 0.60
9 Random 0.40 0.40 0.67 0.25 0.21 0.52 0.69
Table 3: Exponential - varying rounds, means
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Size Pairings Undef Champ Tied Champ Top K Precision at K NDCG Tau Rho
Small Swiss 0.40 0.40 0.73 0.25 0.19 0.49 0.65
Medium Swiss 0.46 0.46 0.76 0.31 0.32 0.47 0.60
Large Swiss 0.85 0.85 0.99 0.25 0.30 0.55 0.71
Extra Large Swiss 0.65 0.65 0.89 0.22 0.28 0.52 0.67
Small Random 0.16 0.17 0.73 0.25 0.19 0.49 0.64
Medium Random 0.19 0.20 0.66 0.19 0.24 0.47 0.60
Large Random 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.25 0.29 0.55 0.71
Extra Large Random 0.52 0.52 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.66
Table 4: Exponential - varying teams, means
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